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ere theExchange Rate Regime
Beginningin 1965, the South Korean economy became increasingly depen-
dent on foreign borrowing. Foreign loan arrivals rose from $183.0 million to
$787.4 million between 1966 and 1971, or clpse to 10 percent of GNP in
1971.1 In 1965, a heavy proportion of the loans came from public sources
overseas. Between 1968 and 1971 more than two-thirds of all foreign loan
arrivals were commercial, mainly suppliers' credits for import of capital equip-
ment from the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and West
Germany (tables 7—1 and 7—2). The sources of public loans also shifted
markedly, from a heavy reliance in the early 1960s on United States AID
grants and development loans on very soft terms to greater reliance in the
later '60s on Japanese, IBRD, and Asian Development Bank loans on rela-
tively hard terms. The increasing emphasis on commercial loans and the shift
of sources of public loans has greatly increased the cost of foreign capital
imports. All loans greater than one year are denominated in foreign currency,
the dollar, the mark, the yen, the franc, or the pound.
OFFICIAL ENCOURAGEMENT OF FOREIGN
CAPITAL IMPORTS
The rapid increase in foreign commercial loans and the shift to more expen-
sive sources of public loans has recently become a matter of concern to Korean
officials. Throughout most of the 1960s, however, the government had strongly
encouraged the import of private foreign capital as a major policy tool in
101
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TABLE 7—i
Arrivals of Foreign Capital and Official Grants, 1966 to 1971
(millions of dollars)
. 196619671968196919701971
A.Foreign capital arrivalsa 197.3296.0562.1697.4709.8830.3
1. Three years and longer 197.3239.3355.5640.3653.7691.5
a. Govt. and multilateral
institutions-loans 72.8105.670.2220.9217.0317.0
b. Private loans 110.2124.0268.4403.5371.5331.6
c. Equity 14.3 9.716.915.965.242.9
2. One to three years — 56.7206.657.156.1138.8
a. Trade credits — 54.7166.627.131.149.3
b. Bank loans — — 40.030.025.089.5




3. Japan P.A.C.b 29.337.430.032.128.216.6
4. Technical assistance 3.7 5.5 7.5 3.9 3.9 5.2
5. Other 2.010.8 6.013.416.522.0
Total 362.2453.4712.8876.1831.0934.2
NOTE: Subitems may not add exactly to totals because of rounding.
SouRce: Economic Planning Board; USAID,
a. Gross basis.
b. Property and claim fund as provided in the Korea-Japan Diplomatic Normalization
Agreement of June 1965.
dealing with the balance of payments. The Foreign Capital Inducement Law
was promulgated in January 1960 at a time when the Development Loan Fund
(DLF) of USAID was the only source of foreign loans to Korea.
In early 1962, the government selected 9 major five-year plan projects
(involving 19 businesses) that required foreign capital. The government then
sent an economic mission to the United States, West Germany, and other in-
dustrialized countries in Europe to negotiate financing for the selected projects.
In July 1962, the government enacted two supplements to the Foreign
Capital Inducement Law. One provided procedures for imports of capital
goods by using long-term export credits of capital exporting countries and
the other established procedures for granting repayment guarantees on foreign
loans. As a safeguard, all foreign loans, investment proposals, and repayment




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































104 FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
tion Committee, which was chaired by the Minister of the Economic Planning
Board.
Tax concessions were also granted to stimulate foreign loans and tech-
nology imports, including full and partial exemptions from individual income
or corporation income tax on the foreign lender's interest income accruing
from approved foreign loans and from income tax on payments made to for-
eigners who provided technical services. Direct foreign investment was en-
couraged by full exemption from individual or corporation income tax of the
foreign investor's income for the first 3 years, a 50 percent reduction in tax for
the next 5 years, full exemption from customs duties on imported capital goods Publi
for approved foreign investment projects, and no capital gains taxes on foreign AT
investment. ID
Because of the positive measures of the government to attract foreign W'
capital, foreign loans and investments "finalized" increased sharply after 1962
om,
and amounted to $222.7 million at the end of 1963 as shown in Table 7_3•2
Asalready mentioned, foreign loans finalized at the end of 1960 were only
about $18.8 million. At the end of 1963, commercial loans finalized amounted
to $127.5 million, larger than the $84.4 million of finalized foreign public Br
loans. Actual "arrivals" of the foreign loans and equity investment were, how-
ever,relatively small in 1961—63 as shown in Table 7—3, since finalized foreign Sv
loans and investment generally required a year or more before the goods and TI
services financed by the foreign capital actually arrived.
; Dire1
In 1966 a new Foreign Capital Inducement Law revised and stream- (7
lined various past laws. The major changes were as follows: Ui
(1) Restrictions on foreign direct investment were removed. First, for- W
eign investors could invest without any floor on the amount; the old law had
specified that domestic investors must own at least 25 percent of the equity
in a given enterprise. Secondly, the maximum limit on annual profit repatria-
tion of 20 percent of invested capital was removed completely.
(2) If foreign-financed firms threatened default on repayment of loans,
the government was authorized to supervise their management and property
and to take any measures necessary to achieve solvency.
(3) Enterprises benefiting from government-guaranteed loans were re- the
quired to float authorized stock within 5 years from the date of approval of first 1.
thegovernment repayment guarantee.
(4) Government repayment guarantees were limited so that the annual invd'
debt service arising from such loans was not to exceed 9 percent of total an-
nual foreign exchange receipts. give
(5) Priority and special tax benefits were to be given to loan project no s
applicants who used domestic capital goods for more than 50 percent of the loan
loan amount contracted. incr
(6) Tax concessions given to enterprises with foreign equity were also banOFFICIAL ENCOURAGEMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IMPORTS
TABLE 7-3





































Public loans—Total (12 cases) 84.4 4.7 3.0 42.8 50.5
AID 61.6 4.7 3.0 27.8 35.5
IDA 14.0 — — 12.4 12.4
West Germany









































Switzerland 9.3 — — 0.3 0.3
Sweden 9.3 — — — —
The Netherlands














































SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Annual Report for 1963, p. 132.
slightly changed in the new law. Foreign enterprises were fully exempted from
the individual income tax, the corporation tax, and the property tax for the
first 5years,and given a 50 percent exemption for the next 3 years. Tariff
and commodity tax exemptions on the import of capital goods by foreign
investors remained unchanged.
The main rationale for the new Foreign Capital Inducement Law was to
give more favorable treatment to foreign direct investment. The new law made
no substantial changes affecting foreign loans. However, the inflow of foreign
loans was greatly accelerated after 1965. The interest rate reform of 1965
increased incentives to borrow from abroad and the system of commercial
bank guarantees on repayments of foreign loans authorized in 1966 stimulated
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foreign lending. Since the interest rate reform of 1965 caused the rate on or-
dinary commercial bank loans to jump from 16 to 26 percent per annum, it
greatly widened the interest rate gap between domestic bank and foreign loans.
The Korea-Japan Diplomatic Normalization Agreement of June 1965
was also important in increasing foreign capital inflows. According to the
Agreement, South Korea was to receive the Property and Claims Fund from
Japan, totalling $500 million ($300 million in grants and $200 million in
public loans) over the next 10 years. In addition, the Japanese Government
was to make available $300 million for commercial loans to South Korea.
Initial grants and loans were received in 1966.
FOREIGN CAPITAL IN SOUTH KOREA'S
ECONOMIC GROWTH
The inflow of foreign capital of all types (total foreign savings) was substan-
tial between 1960 and 1972 (Table 7—4). In 1960, foreign saving accounted
for almost 80 percent of total investment and 8.5percentof GNP. Foreign
TABLE 7-4
Foreign Capital and Gross Investment, 1960 to 1972























Total as Percent Saving as
Foreign Foreign Foreign of Gross Percent of
Year TransfersBorrowing Savings Investment GNP
1960 22.06 —1.07 20.99 78.3 8.5
1961 29.51 —4.22 25.29 65.2 8.5
1962 30.73 7.22 37.95 83.4 10.9
1963 33.73 18.63 52.36 58.0 10.7
1964 44.03 5.10 49.13 48.1 7.0
1965 53.95 —2.42 51.53 42.2 6.4
1966 59.58 28.05 8763 39.0 8.5
1967 60.94 51.92 112.86 40.2 9.2
1968 62.54 121.79 184.33 43.1 11.5
1969 70.86 158.16 229.02 36.9 11.0
1970 55.96 193.35 249.31 35.4 9.6
1971 59.32 294.68 354.00 44.0 11.2
1972a 66.71 148.32 215.03 26.7 5.6
I
1973, pp.298—299. SoultcE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook,
a. Preliminary
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or- saving as a percent of total investment declined substantially over the decade
it so that by 1972 it accounted for less than 35 percent of total investment. As
a percentage of GNP, however, foreign savings had not shown any downward
trend until 1972; previously they had fluctuated year-to-year around an aver-
the age of about 10 percent of current price GNP. The average gross capital-
om output ratio from 1960 to 1970 was 2.5. Given this ratio, the average contri-
in bution to growth has been about 4 percentage points a year during the 1960s.
ent Since the average rate of growth was about 10 percent over the decade, with-
ca. out foreign savings the growth rate might have been closer to 6 percent and
total output in 1970 about 30 percent less than it actually was.
Rough estimates of the contribution of foreign capital to Korea's growth
were also made by another method. We assumed that the increment in output
each year due to foreign capital was the same as the estimated increment in
output due to total investment in that year. The incremental capital-output
ratio in this method was not assumed to be constant, but an increasing function
an- of total investment. The contribution of foreign capital is expressed by the
ted difference in 1971 GNP had there been no foreign capital imports from 1966
ign to 1970. The calculations were made for total foreign savings, total foreign
borrowing (foreign savings less transfers from the rest of the world), and
totalforeigncommerciaL borrowing (excluding borrowing frompublic
sources). The results are (in billions of current won) as follows:
Actual 1971 GNP 3,151.55 = Estimated 1971 GNP without foreign
savings, 1966 to 1970 2,759.99
Estimated 1971 GNP without foreign
• borrowing, 1966 to 1970 2,924.65
— Estimated1971 GNP without foreign
commercial borrowing, 1966 to 1970 3,023.01
These calculations assumed that the relationship between output growth
in the nonagricultural sectors of the economy and investment in those sectors
could be estimated by an ordinary least squares regression of real GNP in
nonagricultural sectors on previous year's GNP and the previous year's real
gross investment (equation 8—2 in Chapter 8). The results show that without
foreign savings (which include foreign aid in the form of transfers and loans)
between 1966 and 1970, total output in 1971 would have been about 12.4
percent less than it actually was.3 Without foreign commercial borrowing
(which includes no foreign aid flows), the level of output would have been
only about 4.1 percent less. The contributions of foreign capital in the late
1960s were relatively modest because the incremental capital-output ratio
rose in those years. The marginal contributions of investment to output de-108 FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
dined. However, if one measures the contribution of foreign savings during
the entire decade of the '60s, the difference in output is quite large. Output in RI
1971 would have been about a third less. That is, almost one-third of 1971
output can be attributed to foreign savings during the previous decade. For-
eign borrowing, however, has not made nearly so substantial a contribution. We
Most foreign savings in the early 1960s took the form of aid transfers, while an
foreign borrowing only became large a few years later when capital productiv- adj
ity was considerably reduced. •cit
the
thecontribution of foreign borrowing to South Korea's economic
growth was modest, the costs of these capital imports incurred during the red
1960s are making themselves felt a decade later in the form of debt service
payments.foreign debt accumulates, with more than $2 billion outstand- in8
ing at the beginning of 1971 (including all debt with a maturity greater than
one year), debt service payments have grown very rapidly, reaching $326.6 Th
million in 1971 or about 28 percent of total export earnings.4 fau
The expected high level of debt service payments in the remainder of the
1970s will introduce a good deal of inflexibility into Korea's balance of pay- to1
ments. With so much foreign exchange required to service loans, imports must tha
bear a greater share of the burden of adjustment if foreign exchange earnings
do not grow as rapidly as they have in the past.
Given the rapid rise in debt service and the experience of other countries
burdened with large debt service payments, South Korea may find it necessary
to renegotiate its outstanding debt. Projections by the Economic Planning ro
Board and the aid donors show that by 1976 debt service including interest ex
on contemplated borrowings should total about $650 million. However, cx- re
ports have grown so rapidly since these projections were calculated that by
1976 the debt service ratio should be well below 20 percent. Although the cot
costs of imported fuel and international loans have increased, they have been m9
more than offset by the extremely rapid growth of South Korea's export earn-
ings. Nevertheless, heavy debt service obligations may pose future difficulties. cuif
For according to the formula in Frank and Cline (1971), the critical ratio of
debt service to export earnings in 1976 will be about 17.8 percent. If this
figure should be exceeded by the actual debt service ratio, a rescheduling of ta1
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p0
ring REAL AND NOMINAL RATES OF INTEREST (
t lfl ON FOREIGN CAPITAL
)7 1
'or- We have seen how South Korea's rapidly increased borrowing from abroad
(On. and her shift to more costly sources of capital may make balance of payments
hue adjustment more difficult and costly in the 1970s unless the foreign trade defi-
tuv cit is reduced. According to classical marginal economic analysis, however,
more relevant question is whether the rate of return on foreign financed
investment has exceeded the rate of interest on foreign borrowing. If it has,
then in theory foreign borrowing is profitable and should be encouraged.
But this approach ignores a number of macroeconomic factors that
might determine the cost of foreign borrowing. First, there is the problem of
mic reducing the trade deficit and of generating the trade surpluses eventually
e required to pay back principal and interest on foreign borrowing. Second, say-
•ice ings must increase rapidly enough not only to repay foreign loans, but also to
- financesufficient domestic investment to maintain satisfactory rates of growth.
66 Third, to the extent that foreign loans are the debts of government or de-
faulted by private investors under government guarantee, the government must
the have sufficient command over resources through taxation or local borrowing
a - topay its debts and finance its own domestic expenditures. Fourth, local firms
that borrow large amounts abroad may be particularly vulnerable to credit
squeezes and large devaluations. Finally, dependence on foreign borrowing
g and the debt servicing obligations that follow make balance of payments ad-
jes justment to short-run cyclic factors more costly and difficult.6
Even if these other factors are ignored, the classical view of foreign bor-
• rowing begs a number of questions in a world in which monetary, fiscal, and
exchange rate policy can affect real rates of interest which do not necessarily
reflect relative factor scarcities in different countries.7 Under conditions of dif-
by ferential rates of inflation and differing degrees of monetary restraint among
he countries, social and private real rates of interest may diverge and lead to too
en much or too little foreign borrowing.
Our argument assumes that the U.S. dollar is the international reserve
es. currency and that the world economy is one in which a Fisherian "real in-
of terest" analysis applies, i.e., one in which rates of inflation may vary from
country to country but remain fairly steady within each country where expec-
of tations adjust to steady rates. In this theoretical framework, we argue that
the real social cost of foreign borrowing in a country like Korea is the nominal
rate of interest on foreign-currency-denominated foreign loans less the rate
of inflation of prices of internationally traded goods. The nominal rate of in-
terest must be so adjusted because repayment of a loan represents a future
cost, either as foregone imports, or as additional exports to save or earn the
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necessary foreign exchange. If the prices of internationally traded goods go up,
then the cost of servicing the loan is reduced by the amount of the price infla-
tion. Symbolically, we write for the real social cost of foreign borrowing (r8):
(7—1)
whereis the nominal rate of interest on foreign loans andis the rate of
price inflation of internationally traded goods.
The private real interest cost to the local borrower, however, may be
quite different. The nominal rate of interest on foreign borrowing must be
adjusted by the local rate of price inflation and the rate at which the local cur-
rency devalues. The local borrower repays the loan in terms of local currency
which must be converted into dollars at the future rate of exchange. As such,
the real cost of repayment declines when the local price level increases and
increases when the local currency is devalued. The formula, then, for the real
private interest cost of the loanis
r,=rn—rdp+re (7—2)
where Td,isthe rate of domestic price inflation and r6 is the rate of local cur-
rency devaluation.
If the real private cost of foreign borrowing is less than the real social
cost, then foreign borrowing will be excessive if local borrowers incur debt
up to the level at which the real rate of return equals the real private cost of
foreign borrowing. This is illustrated by the marginal efficiency of investment
schedule as shown in Figure 7—1. The optimal level of foreign borrowing is
F1 at which point the real social cost of foreign borrowing equals the rate of the
return on investment. The actual level of foreign borrowing will tend toward, the
F2, the level at which the rate of return equals the private cost of foreign bor- in:
rowing and which exceeds the optimal level. The social and private costs of sut
foreign borrowing will thus only be equal if
(7—3)
tI
or if the rate of local currency devaluation equals the rate of domestic price tio4
inflation less the rate of inflation of prices of internationally traded goods. op4,
sh4
is
EFFICIENCY OF FOREIGN BORROWING CO
inti
The effect of a divergence between the real social and real private interest costs ma,
of a foreign loan on efficiency of investment can be shown in terms of a Fish- cur
erian analysis of consumption, investment and interest rates. For purposes of mit,
this analysis, we assume a single commodity world and two discrete time pe-
riods. The analysis may be generalized to multiple time periods, but the basic cai
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FIGURE 7-1
Marginal Efficiency of Investment Schedule
Figure 7—2 shows a Fisherian diagram with consumption in period t on
the horizontal axis and consumption in period t + 1 on the vertical axis. If
there is no saving and no investment, output in period t is 0G.andoutput
in period t + 1 is OE. Output in both periods is equal (OG =OE),and con-
sumption in both periods is the same and equal to output.
The curve ABC is a transformation curve, the slope of which is one plus
3) the single period rate of return on capital. The curve HI is a social indifference
curve, the slope of which is the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
ice tion in period t and period t + 1 or one plus the rate of time preference. The
optimal distribution of consumption between period t and period t + 1is
shown by the point B. The optimal level of savings and investment in period t
is given by the distance FG. Total output in period t + 1 is the same as total
consumption in period t + 1 and equal to OD. The equilibrium or optimal
interest rate is the same as the optimal rate of return on capital and the opti-
mal rate of time preference. All are equal to the slope of the transformation
curve ABC at B minus unity (or the slope of the indifference curve HI at B
minus unity).
The analysis so far assumes that there is no foreign borrowing. If foreign
capital is available at a rate of interest less than the equilibrium interest rate























aperiods t and t + 1 and increase the level of social welfare. The possibility is
depicted in Figure 7—3.
In Figure 7—3, the slope of the line MN is one plus the rate of interest
on a foreign loan (i.e., foreign capital import). The availability of foreign
loans allows for any combination of consumption in periods t and 1 + 1 along
the line MN which is tangent to the transformation curve ABC. The optimal
combination of consumption in periods t and t + 1 is represented by point B'
which lies above and to the right of B, indicating that it is possible to achieve
greater consumption in both periods when foreign borrowing is permitted.
Total foreign borrowing in period t is given by the distance KF' while
domestic saving is F'G. Total income in periodis OG and consumption OF'.
In period t + 1, total product (domestic) is OD', and LD' represents domestic
savings. Foreign savings is negative and also equal to LD' which represents
payments of principal and interest on the original loan KF'. The foreign bor-
rowing is efficient when the rate of interest on the foreign borrowing is less
than the domestic equilibrium rate without foreign borrowing.
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FIGURE 7-2
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FIGURE 7-3
Optimal Consumption Allocation over Time with Foreign Borrowing
Suppose, however, we complicate our analysis by allowing a local money
is supply and price inflation. We assume a simple quantity theory. The govern-
ment through its central bank determines a money supply and this in turn
est determines the price level for our single commodity. The foreign price of the
ign commodity is assumed to be the numeraire so that the foreign price of one
ng unit of the good is always unity. Suppose the existence of an exchange bank
nal that exchanges local currency for foreign currency and vice versa at a rate
B' determined by the government. To keep matters simple, suppose also that the
we exchange bank acts as an export and import agent. When it receives local cur-
rency, it purchases the domestic good and sells it abroad to obtain foreign cur-
iile rency to make payments abroad. When it receives foreign currency, it imports
F'. goods from abroad and sells them domestically to obtain local currency.
We assume that the exchange bank carries no reserves from period to
nts period. Therefore, payments and receipts of foreign currency must balance.
or- If local currency proceeds are not sufficient to make payments equal receipts,
ess the government taxes local entrepreneurs in kind and turns the proceeds over
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currency to make payments. If payments are less than receipts, the exchange
bank imports commodities with the excess receipts and the goods are distrib-
uted as subsidies to private individuals.
Given this simple model, suppose the price level rises from period t to
period t + 1. Let Pt+i/Pt be the ratio of prices in the two periods. On the other
hand, suppose the exchange rate between the foreign and domestic currency
remains the same. If foreign loans are denominated in the foreign currency
and the rate of interest on the foreign loans is r, the real value of the loan re-
ceipt in terms of local currency is and the real value of the local currency
repayments is L(1 +r)/pt÷i where L is the amount of the loan in terms of
local currency. The ratio of payments to the original amount of the loan in
real terms is
(1 + r) =(1+ r + —r)(7—4)
Pt+i Pt
Pt
where=Pt+i—PE.The approximation indicates that the real rate of inter-
est to the domestic borrower is nearly equal to the rate of interest r on the
foreign loan less the rate of inflation Thissituation is depicted in Fig-
ure 7—4wherethe slope of the line MN is the ratio of repayment in real terms
to the original amount of the loan in real terms or approximately equal to
(1 + r —
Private entrepreneurs, acting on the basis of the private real rate of inter-
est (assuming that they anticipate the inflation), borrow an amount KF' from
abroad, expecting to reach the consumption point B'. The actual interest rate
in terms of the good (the rate which the exchange bank must pay abroad), et
however, is represented by the slope (1 + r) of the line M'N'. The local cur- etj
rency proceeds of the exchange bank are not enough to purchase the amounts
of goods required to pay the foreign loan. The local currency proceeds are afl
D'P in terms of goods. In order to repay the loan, the government taxes local n9
borrowers by an amount PL to meet the full repayment represented by D'L. in1
The actual consumption point is B" rather than B'. The actual consumption
point B" represents less consumption in both periods than could be achieved tb
if private entrepreneurs acted on the basis of the real foreign rate of interest.
For example, the point B which lies above and to the right of B" could be
achieved if the entrepreneurs acted under the correct assumption as to the
interest rate. R
The only way to reach the optimal point B, given the rate of price infla- 0
lion,is to devalue the local currency at a rate equal to the rate of inflation.
The real value of the local currency receipts of the loan are L .et/ptand the ii
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FIGURE 7-4
Inefficiencyin Consumption over Time
et is the exchange rate. The ratio of the two is equal to (1 + r) if and only if
et/pt =et+i/pt+ior 1 + is equal to 1 +
In this model, when the rate of devaluation equals the rate of inflation,
an efficient investment pattern is achieved. The analysis assumes that the inter-
national price is the numeraire and it can easily be generalized to a situation
in which international prices increase. In that case, efficient investment occurs
only when the local currency devalues at a rate equal to the difference between
the rate of domestic inflation and the rate of inflation of international prices—
that is, when the real private and social interest rates are equal.
REAL PRIVATE AND SOCIAL COSTS
OF FOREIGN BORROWING
In Table 7—5, we have estimated the private and social real interest costs for




























onforeignloansa 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.9 7.1 7.0
Less: rate of inflation of
prices of internationally
traded goodsb —2.3—2.3—2.3—2.3—2.3—2.3
Equals: estimated real social
interest cost of foreign loans 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.6 4.8 4.7
Nominal interest rate on
foreign loans 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.9 7. 1 7.0
Less: rate of domestic
priceinflationc



















Equals: estimated real private
costofforeignloans —2.5—2.4—2.0—2.2—1.0—1.1
(0.3)(0.4)(0.8)(0.6)(1.8)(1.7)
a. Weighted annual average rate of interest on foreign loan agreements.
b. Rate of inflation from 1965 to 1970 of wholesale prices of major trading partners,
using wholesale price indexes weighted by trade volume.
c. Rate of inflation of GNP deflator of Korea, 1965 to 1970. Figures in parentheses
are rate of inflation of wholesale price index over the same period.
d. Average rate of devaluation exchange rate, 1965 to 1970.
price index is the GNP deflator, the private real interest cost has been 5.8
percentage points lower than the social real interest cost and that there has
been a powerful incentive to import foreign capital at an excessive rate. In
fact, the real private interest cost of foreign loans has been substantially nega-
tive. If the wholesale price index is used, however, the' divergence between
private and social costs is smaller, but still 3 percentage points.
The price index used for prices of internationally traded goods was a
weighted average of U.S. and Japanese wholesale prices. This is probably a
slight overestimate of the rate of price increase for South Korea's traded goods.
Japanese export prices have tended to increase less rapidly than the wholesale
price index while U.S. export prices have probably increased slightly more
rapidly than wholesale prices. The difference, however, between growth in
Japanese export prices and wholesale prices has probably been somewhat
greater than the difference in growth of U.S. export prices and wholesale
prices.8 If South Korean export and import prices indexes were available,
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TABLE 7-5
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theywould probably show somewhat more divergence between private and
social real interest costs than those shown in Table 7—5andthus somewhat
= more of an incentive to borrow abroad beyond the optimal level.
0 The rate of devaluation used in the computations in Table 7—5 was the
• average rate of devaluation between 1965 and 1970. includes a period
• from August 1965 to the end of 1967 when the exchange rate was pegged at
about 270 won to the dollar and rapid growth of foreign commercial borrow-
ing began. Interviews with businessmen suggest that at that time, there was
3 no expectation that the exchange rate would change as much as it did during
the late 1960s. If this is true, the large influx of foreign capital may have been
7 due in part to an underestimate of the real private costs because of an expecta-
tion of a stable exchange rate. The value of the won, however, gradually fell
•.0 between the beginning of 1968 and mid-1971, at which time there was a
sharp devaluation. Nevertheless, during 1968 and 1969, foreign commercial
.3 borrowing continued to grow rapidly. In 1970, however, the demand for for-
•.5) eignloans was reduced sharply. Perhaps by 1970, it had become clear to
.2 businessmen that movement in the value of the won was not temporaly and
that the true cost of foreign borrowing was likely to be greater than they had
1 originally expected, although government ceilings on foreign borrowing may
have been chiefly responsible for the slow growth of foreign borrowing in
1970.
In 1971 and 1972 also, the demand for foreign commercial borrowing
seems to have slackened. According to businessmen interviewed, their desire
for foreign loans was curbed by the devaluation of June 1971 and by the re-
introduction of the rapidly gliding peg in early 1972.
.8 FOREIGN BORROWING AND SECTORAL
•as RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In
a- We have shown how a failure to devalue at a sufficient rate, given domestic
en price inflation, is likely to lead to excessive foreign borrowing and investment.
We now note also that, because of the institutional nature of capital markets,
a low real private interest rates on foreign loans may distort the sectoral alloca-
a tion of resources.
Is. In particular, foreign commercial loans are often most easily available in
tIe the form of supplier credits. Thus, loans are often tied to purchases of capital
re equipment abroad. Of course, this is often true for public loans as well. This
in has two effects: First, low-cost foreign loans favor those sectors that are rela-
tat tively heavy users of foreign capital equipment. Second, low-cost foreign loans
tie relative to local commercial loans may be a form of negative protection to the
le, local capital goods industries.
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Table 7—6 compares local real interest rates with the real private interest
costs of foreign borrowing. Local real interest rates tend to be much higher,
particularly those on commercial bank loans. Local capital equipment sup-
pliers are thus at a disadvantage in that available sources of financing carry
higher real interest costs than financial sources for purchase of foreign equip-
ment. This disadvantage can be viewed as an effective tax on local equipment
producers. This effective tax can be quantitatively assessed by measuring the
difference in present value of a stream of repayments required to service two
types of loan, a loan to purchase foreign equipment and a loan to purchase
domestic equipment. (See the appendix to this chapter for mathematical
details.)
Table 7—7 gives the percentage subsidy implicit in the purchase of 1,000
won of foreign machinery financed by a foreign loan instead of 1,000 won of
domestic equipment financed by a domestic loan. Both KDB equipment and







Comparative Real Interest Costs of Domestic and Foreign Loans,
1965 to 1970
. 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Nominal local interest rates:
Commercial bank prime rate 18.526.026.025.824.024.0
Korea Development Bank
rate on equipment loans 9.5 11.0 11.0 11.0 12.0 12.0
Real local interest rates equals
nominal rate less rate of
inflation of 8.5 percent for
wholesale price index (11.3
percent for GNP deflator)
for 1965—70















equipment rate 1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5
(—1.8)(—0.3)(—0.3)(—0.3)(0.7)(0.7)
Real private interest Cost












NOTE: Figures in parentheses are based on use of the GNP deflator. All other real
interest rates are based on the wholesale price index.
SOURCE: Bank of Korea, EconomicStatistics Yearbook, 1971,pp. 133—135.
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TABLE 7-7















Foreign loan 775.4 813.4
Commercial bank loan 917.4 1,009.9
KDB equipment loan 765.9 808.8
NOTE: Terms are 5 years repayment, 20 percent down. Dis-
count rate is 15 percent.
For KDB equipment loans, the cost of financing capital goods purchases
whether locally or by foreign loan is about the same. For bank loans, however,
the difference in costisvery great. Thecost(present value of repayments) of
financing a 1,000 won loanwas 917.4 for a commercial bank loan, or 18 per-
cent greater than the cost of a foreign loan. In 1970, the difference had grown
to 24 percent. This means that local sellers were subject to an implicit tax of
18 to 24 percent when competing against foreign capital goods financed
abroad when commercial bank loans were the source of local finance.
These estimates do not take into account the government's special loan
fund instituted in 1967 for financing purchases of domestic machinery. Very
little credit was provided at first under this program, and there were adminis-
trative difficulties at the outset. After a couple of years, however, this special
loan fund grew in importance and offset some of the interest rate distortions
that had favored foreign-made machinery purchases.
DISCONTINUOUS DEVALUATION
AND GLIDING PARITY
Wehave not yet distinguished between discontinuous devaluations and gradual
changesin the exchange rate. In South Korea, discontinuous devaluations oc-
curred in February 1960, January and February 1961, May 1964, and June
1971. The rate was allowed to float for a while in the spring of 1965, between
1968 and June 1971,andagain beginning in early 1972 until June of that
year. Thus, Korea has alternated between a policy of gradual devaluation and
an adjustable exchange rate peg. Both policies have been aimed at maintaining
the purchasing power parity of the won by adjusting for the effects of domestic
and international price inflation.
Whatever the effects of the two policies on commodity exports and im-
ports might be, the effect of pegged rates with discontinuous devaluations on
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the capital side of the balance of payments is likely to be destabilizing under d
conditions of rapid domestic inflation. First, if borrowers of foreign capital
come to expect fixed rates accompanied by occasional large devaluations, they o
will set a very high premium on guessing when the next devaluation will take d
place. If no devaluation is expected for a few years, the demand for foreign a'
capital will be very great. Borrowers will attempt to borrow as much capital ir
as possible when the exchange risk is believed to be low and conversely the Ic
demand for foreign loans may fall off sharply when expectations of an im- Ic
minent devaluation are high. Thus, the demand for foreign loans will be very
unstable and will fluctuate in response to rumors of devaluation. This effect, '
ofcourse, occurs on the commodity side, but to a much lesser degree. When
domestic producers expect a devaluation in the near future, the current de-
,
mand for imports will be high and the short-run supply of exports will fall off. o
But the extent to which imports can be accelerated and exports held back may ti
be limited by transportation and storage facilities. The cost of investing in a
transport and storage facilities to handle large short-run fluctuations in stocks f
as a hedge against devaluation may be very high. There is no comparable cost o
on. the capital side. Increasing one's portfolio of foreign loans involves only p
the interest charges on the loans. r
Second, pegged exchange rates with discontinuous devaluations distort h
the term structure of foreign loans. There is an increased premium on short- a
term credits in preference to long term. When credits are denominated in for- c
eign currency, short-term credits with frequent roll-over substantially reduce ii
the exchange risk to the borrower when large devaluations may take place.
On the other hand, if borrowers expect devaluations to be gradual, continuous,
and in line with the divergence between domestic and international price infla-
tion, they have no reason to shift foreign loan portfolios to short-term loans
as a hedge against devaluation.
Finally, pegged rates with discontinuous devaluations cause large and F
discontinuous changes in the value of foreign loan liabilities. In other words,
producers and traders who have guessed incorrectly and find themselves -
holdinglarge foreign loan liabilities may suffer large losses in their netreal -0*
asset positions. Whenever large amounts of foreign loans are outstanding,
abrupt and large devaluations can substantially affect the asset positions of S*
firms and individuals. Those who suffer such losses are likely to resist further
devaluations, as they have in Korea, and thus devaluation becomes a politi-
cally dangerous and increasingly difficult measure to implement. As a result, e
domestic inflation quickly erodes the purchasing power parity of the exchange
rate and corrective action becomes longer delayed and more problematical. e
As an alternative to gradual devaluation or to pegged exchange rates e
with discontinuous devaluation, a flat surtax on imports could be imposed
together with the same flat subsidy on exports. This would be equivalent to a
"I
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r devaluation for commodity transactions. Since capital transactions and trans-
fer payments would continue to take place on the basis of the nondevalued
official exchange rate, the political problem that would otherwise arise from
deterioration of the net asset position of borrowers of foreign capital could be
• avoided. The objection, however, to this approach is that real interest rates
1 in terms of won would remain low and the social opportunity cost of foreign
•e loans would continue to be greater than the private real interest cost of foreign
- loans.While flat surcharges and subsidies on commodity transactions may help
•
maintaina realistic exchange rate for exports and imports, the demand for
foreign loans would continue to exceed equilibrium.
— Toachieve an efficient level of foreign capital inflow and efficient use of
foreign loans, a gliding parity approach to exchange rate adjustment has in
our view a good deal of merit. Since a gliding parity offers no excessive incen-
tives to borrow abroad, capital movement stabilityis more likely to be
achieved. Real domestic interest rates, however, may exceed the real rate on
foreign loans even if purchasing power parity is maintained. Thus, if purchases
of domestic equipment are usually financed through domestic loans and im-
ported equipment through foreign loans, the domestic machinery industry may
remain at a disadvantage. If, however, the same real domestic interest rate
had been maintained during the 1960s, while the official exchange rate was
- adjustedto maintain parity, then at least the disincentive to domestic ma-
- chinerypurchase would have been reduced, since the divergence between real
e interest rates on foreign and domestic loans would have been narrowed.
ECONOMIC POLICY AND FOREIGN LOANS
S
Exchange rate policy in South Korea has facilitated the inflow of foreign loans,
perhaps excessively, and has resulted in a net disincentive to local machinery
producers. In fact, a local guarantee program favors imported machinery.
Domestic borrowers of foreign loans can obtain Korea Development Bank
or commercial bank guarantees on repayment (both amortization and interest
payments) in accordance with the Foreign Capital Inducement Law. This
system greatly facilitates the import of foreign loans since foreign lenders are
guaranteed repayment regardless of the domestic borrower's credit standing.
- Secondbest solutions in place of gliding parity include either an interest
equalization tax or quantitative restrictions on capital flows. The main rationale
for an interest equalization tax would not be the common notion that it would
equalize domestic and foreign loan interest rates, but rather that it would
equalize the real interest cost in terms of won and the real interest cost in
I terms of dollars. A differential between foreign and domestic interest rates
may reflect real differences in opportunity costs of foreign and domestic cap-I
a
r
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ital. The differential between real dollar and real won interest cost of foreign if
loans, however, represents a divergency between social and private costs. th
Controls on foreign borrowing have been in effect since 1962 when the
Foreign Capital Inducement Deliberation Committee was set up in the Eco-
nomic Planning Board. In practice, however, foreign loan applications were
generally encouraged if they could meet minimal criteria and no strict limits
on foreign borrowing were enforced. Recently, however, an IMF standby ai
agreement has required the Korean government to issue letters of intent to
strictly limit foreign capital movements by loan categories based on the term
of the loan. The strictest limitations were placed on one- to three-year loans,
while very long term loans were given liberal treatment. The effect of IMF
pressure can be seen in the 1970 figures for loan arrivals and agreements
(tables 7—1 and 7—2). After increasing more than three and a half times is
between 1966 and 1969, foreign capital arrivals increased by less than 2 per-
cent in 1970. Foreign commercial loan agreements, which increased almost
ten times between 1964 and 1969, actually decreased in 1970. These restric-
tions on foreign capital imports may not be applied in the most evenhanded
or efficient way, but they have virtually stopped the extremely rapid growth
in foreign capital imports. cq
As part of the revision of economic policies in August 1972, domestic
interest rates were lowered. At the same time, foreign interest rates had begun d
to creep up with the net result that the incentive to borrow abroad has been
reduced. Furthermore, since South Korea's exports continue to grow very
rapidly, and since imports in the early 1970s have on the average grown much•
less rapidly, the need to borrow abroad to finance a trade deficit has abated.
The domestic machinery industry has begun to develop and special govern-
ment-sponsored credit programs have spurred sales. Thus, the need to finance r
capital goods purchases abroad has become relatively less important. The days
of very heavy foreign borrowing, excessively encouraged by distortions in
interest rates, will probably come to an end in this decade. During the 1960s,
however, the high degree of reliance on capital imports made important con- ec
tributions to South Korean growth. ed
1'
APPENDIX:CALCULATION OF IMPLICIT
SUBSIDIES ON FOREIGN LOANS
For the purchaser of foreign equipment, the present value per won of a loan
can be expressed in the following way: Let
A0down payment required on the purchase of equipment, expressed as a ti
fraction per dollar lent
amortization payment in year t, expressed as a fraction per dollar lent,
for t =1,-.., T,where T is the maturity of the loan. sAPPENDIX: CALCULATION OF IMPLICIT SUBSIDIES ON FOREIGN LOANS 123










—:F are the down payment and amortization payment, respectively, in real won
terms. The present value per won of a loan to purchase the foreign equipment
•es is
st A1* / (1 + rp (1 /(1+ p)t
th whereisthe real private rate of interest given in equation (7—2). The dis-
count rate pisthe real opportunity cost of domestic capital.
The present value per won of a loan used to finance the purchase of
domestic equipment is
T T 1—1
ry B,/ (1 +p)t+rd (1 / (1+p)t (7—8)
1=0 1=1
whereB0 is the down payment ratio andfor t= 1, .., Tthe amortization
rate, respectively, in real won terms. rdisthe real rate of interest on domestic
loans.
The differential between the present value per won of a loan used to
purchase domestic equipment (7—8) and a loan used to purchase foreign
equipment (7—7) is the implicit subsidy rate to the purchases of the foreign
equipment or the implicit tax rate on purchases of domestic equipment.
Implicit tax rate on domestic producers
of capital equipment =PVd—tv1.
Even if the price of domestic equipment is lower than the price of foreign
equipment and the domestic and foreign equipment are equal in quality, the
effect of the real interest rate differential may make it profitable to purchase
the foreign equipment. That is, the implicit tax rate in (7—9) could more
a than make up for the difference in price.
These implicit tax rates or subsidy rates can be incorporated into a see-
toral analysis of effective protection in much the same way as other taxes and
subsidies are (see the previous chapter).
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NOTES
1. This includes arrivals of loans of maturity greater than one year. Foreign loan
arrivals are shown in Table 7—1 and include all the items under row A except for equity
(direct) investment which came to be important only in 1970. "Arrivals" indicates the
amount of credit actually drawn by local importers as distinct from the amount of bor-
rowing based on completed loan agreements. Separate statistics are kept for arrivals
and for agreements.
• 2. A loan is "finalized" when an agreement is signed, while loan arrivals may be
delayed for several years after finalization.
3. This estimate is smaller than it would be if we assumed a constant incremental
capital-output ratio.
4. USAID, Korea Mission.
5. Among 145 observations taken elsewhere during the 1950s and '60s, the critical
debt service indicator was correct more than 90 percent of the time in predicting resched-
uling.SeeFrankandCline (1971).
6. For a more detailed discussion of these and other factors see Frank (1970).
7. For references to the literature about differential rates of price inflation under
fixed exchange rates and how they may stimulate capital movements which are not
necessarily in the direction of higher marginal efficiency of capital, see Willet (1970).
8. See McKinnon (1971). The price indexes used by McKinnon are taken from
unpublished estimates by the U.S. Department of Labor. Export and import price indexes
I
arenot generally available for the major world-trading economies. Unit-value indexes, a
which are sometimes used as price indexes of traded goods, are usually quite unreliable. S
9.Present value of 1970 loan is in terms of 1965 present value, using 1970 relative
interest rates. is
0
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